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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S oRIEF
Respondent in her brief on appeal has resorted to
niskading statements and innuendo rather than presenting an
arguriitctlt based on factual statements.

Even the purported

"Stalernen t Of Facts" is erroneous and not supported by the
re co rd.
An occasional harmless error in the brief can be
o\'erlooked as simply an innocent mistake.

However, when the

inaccurate statements are material and important to the equitable resolution of this property settlement they can only
have the purpose of misleading the Supreme Court as to the
true L1cts and the status of the evidence.
For example, on page 3 of Respondent's "Statement
Of Facts" the statement is made that "the court distributed

the proper tv of the marriage 77% to the Plain ti ff and 2 3%
to the Defendant."

This statement is false and misleading

and the Respondent's counsel either knows it is false or he
has not read Appellant's brief and cannot tmderstand simple
arithmetic.

The trial court awarded the furniture and auto-

mobile to the Respondent (Tr. P290, LL14-20) and Respondent
herself valued these items at $2,000.00 and $3,000.00, respectively (Plaintiff's Full Disclosure Financial Declaration,
page 2).

In paragraph 3 of the trial court's FINDINGS Respondent

was awarded the first $19,027.00 of the $27,000.00 sales price
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from the sale of the parties St. George home, leaving ab
of $7,973.00 to be distributed.

a1anc
It was only that portion r
o"

the $7,973.00 remaining after costs of sale had been deducte

2

that the trial court awarded 77% to Respondent and 23% to
Appellant.

The costs of sale totaled $1,802.67, leaving only

$6,170.33 to be distributed 77"/o and 23"/o.

Of course, 237. of

$6,170.33 is only $1,419.18, not $6,945.39 which is 23/.of
the $30,197.33, which is the total property of the marriage
(see page 8 of Appellant's

brief).

Appellant's $1,419.18

amounts to only 4. 7"/o of the property of the marriage and
Appellant's share would be even less if we took into accowit
the savings and certificates of deposit (amounts unknown) tha:
were also awarded to Respondent (Tr. P290, LL21-25).
Appellant's counsel is disturbed that Respondent
would misrepresent the property division actually made by the
trial court.

Pages 3 and 8 of Appellant's brief clearly and

accurately show that Appellant received only 4. 7% of the
$30, 197. 33 marital estate, not counting savings and certifica'
of deposit of uncertain amounts that were also awarded to
Respondent.

Yet Respondent persists throughout her brief in

claiming that Appellant received 23% of the property.

For

example, page 9 of Respondent's brief states "The trial court
distributed the property 77"/ to the Plaintiff-Respondent and
. st
23% to the Defendant-Appellant." Then on page 19 the £ir
0

sentence of Respondent's conclusion states .!.'Plain tiff-Respon·
respectfully submits that the trial court's award of 777, to
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the Plaintiff-Respondent and 23% to the Defendant-Appellant
of the marital estates was proper and clearly within the
discretion of the court."

This sentence would be somewhat

truthful if the word "deceitfully" were substituted for the
word "respectfully".

After making that false statement the

Respondent has the barefaced audacity in the very next sentence
of the conclusion to suggest that Appellant's brief is based
on "assumptions" without having pointed out a single assumption
or unsupportable fact that has been relied upon in Appellant's
brief.
On the contrary, Appellant's brief is based upon
the record and quotes extensively from the transcript, largely
from Resp on dent's own testimony.

The only fact or figure used

in Appellant's brief that is not in the record is the $1,802.67
costs of sale of the St. George home.

That figure was not

known at the time of trial but both parties signed a closing
statement which disclosed the actual amount of the costs of
."

sale to be $1,802.67 and counsel for both parties received a
copy of that closing statement.

In the last paragraph of his

FINDINGS the trial judge estimated that the costs of sale
would be $2, 000. 00.

Respondent has not disputed the accuracy

of the $1,802.67 figure and it should therefore stand.

Inci-

~ntally, had the costs of sale actually been $2,000.00 the

Appellant would have received an even smaller property settle-

n'

ment, both in dollar amount and percentage of the marital
estate, making Appellant's share even less than 4. 7%.
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Respondent's brief relies heavily upon innuendo
and half-truths which characterize the Appellant
blackguard living off Respondent as a parasite.

as a veri tab'
The brief

dwells at length and places unwarranted emphasis upon Appell&::

conduct in leaving Respondent several times during the marria[i
and on Appellant's "gambling habit" in order to justify the
trial court's lopsided award to Respondent.

In a marriage

"it is seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly guilty
or wholly innocent party" and that:
"We recognize that there is no authority in our
law for administering punitive measures in a divom
judgment,
and that to do so would be improper ... "
Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956)
Appellant testified that he left Respondent because of her
sarcastic nature and because of family disagreements that
occurred on some 10 trips to Alpine, Texas to visit Respondent';
family (Tr. Pl58, LLlS-22).

Respondent apparently enjoyed

his companionship or the security his presence provided inasc•:
as she accepted him back every time except the last.

Refer·

ences to Appellant's gambling in Respondent's brief has been
b lawn totally out of proportion.

A reading of the transcript

shows that both of them went to Las Vegas and enjoyed gambling
It was nothing more than a recreational activity for them.
It is apparent that the trial court, as has counsel in his
brief, been excessively influenced by Respondent ' s ace usation>
and recriminations against Appellant.
Respondent would have the court s:nd Appellant

011

of the marriage with an old suitcase and a few old clot~les

-4-
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I

and asl<s the court to ignor the substantial value of Appellant's
work on three different homes.

Respondent claims that by so

doing Appellant would be no worse off than he was prior to
the marriage.

This is not true because Appellant is now six

years older and he could have been gainfully employed during
the years he spent fixing up their three homes.

Further,

Respondent's argument ignors the real question that must be
answered in divorce property settlements.

That question is-

"How can the property be divided to enable both parties to
continue their lives in a happy and useful manner."

This has

been the consistent theme of nearly all Supreme Court decisions
on property settlement questions for the last 20 years or more.
How could the Appellant possibly pursue his life in
a happy and useful manner 1.IDder the judgment of the trial

court?

By taking his old suitcase held together with a rope

and joining the hobo circuit?:

Meanwhile, Respondent takes

all the property to Alpine, Texas to live near her daughter
who owns a shopping center.

How can the Appellant be "main-

tained" as required by Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, in the situation in which he has been placed
by the trial court?

The court in Martinett v. Martinett 8

Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958) made a pertinent statement
in regard to this statute on page 823 when it said:
"It is important to note that this statute makes
no distinction between the spouses.
It does not
contemplate, nor should there be,-.any d~scrimination
or inequality in such awards on the basis of sex.
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They may be made in favor of either spouse a d
should be based upon the needs of the partiesn d
the equities of the situation being dealt with a~
Perhaps Appellant should be awarded alimony to help meet his
needs for future maintenance.

At the very least an adjustment

of the completely lopsided property settlement is in order.
Respondent's brief apparently attempts to mislead
the Supreme Court by making several references as to how
the trial court applied the rules of law found in the case
of Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, Utah,

(1979).

Respondent's

brief states, on page 9, that "In light of all the facts the
trial court clearly followed the guidance provided in the
recent case of Read v. Read

" and on page 10 that "It

would appear that the trial court was very cautious to proper::
apply the rule of Read v. Read Supra."

The trial judge in

the Read case was the same judge who heard this case.

The

FINDINGS in this case were made March 2, 19 79 while the Supre"
Court decision in the Read case was not filed until April 4,

1979, a month later.

Therefore, it would have been impossible

for the trial judge to have considered the Supreme Court's
opinion in the Read case as the Respondent's brief implies.
The trial judge's findings in this case are ample evidence
that he was again punishing the party he found "was guilty
of gross and repeated marital misconduct" by awarding nearly
a 11 t h e property to t h e Respon d en t .

The tr)._. al J. udge apparent!

made these findings without knowledge that l,lis decision in
Read had been remanded for modifications.
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Respondent's brief also misleads the court when it
states on page 6 that Respondent's separate property was needed
to pay for the improvements made to the three homes and is
again misleading when it states on page 13 that Respondent
funded all improvements to the homes.

Appellant's brief shows,

on pages 14 to 17, that Respondent's claims are unsupported
by the record.

The parties received more than enough money

from the sales of their homes to recover the original cost and
to pay for al 1 the improvements.

In fact, there was enough

money to reimburse Appellant for the value of his labor ($4,970.00)
with an overall profit of $1,819.23 still remaining.

Thus, the

parties were able to meet their ordinary living expenses with
their joint social security incomes.

The improvements made

on the Roswell and St. George homes were paid for through
joint checking accounts to which both parties deposited their
monthly income (Tr. PP127-128, Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13, and Tr.
Pl86, LL7-13).

The accounting below proves from the record

that the parties received enough money from the sales of their
three homes to recover the original cost of each, to pay for
all improvements, and to pay Appellant for the reasonable
value of his labor with a profit of $1,819.23 remaining.
Sales
Sales
Sales
Total

$24,500.00
25,000.00
2 7 000. 00
$76,500.00

Price-Ruidoso (Tr. P92, Ll5)
Price-Roswell (Exhibit 5)
Price-St. George (Tr. Pl09, L22)
Received

I

-.
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!

Less:

Closing Costs

Ruidoso (Tr. P155, LL6-ll)

NONE

$

Roswell (Exhibit 5)

1,894.11

St. George
Net Proceeds Received

1,802.67

Less:

~,

I

Original Costs
$17,500.00

Roswell (Tr. P47, LL24-25)

17,500.00

St. George (Tr. PlOl, L24)

19,027.50

54,02).jG
$18,775.n

Remaining for Improvements
Improvements

Ruidoso (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25)

$ 1,050.00
4' 870 .10
6,958.39

Roswell (Tr. PP49-50)
St. George (Tr. P53)
Add back Refrigerator Respondent
still has (Tr. P261, L23)

(892.00)

11, 986 .4)
$ 6,789.1)

Remaining for Appellant's Labor
Less:

I

$72 ,803.11

Ruidoso (Tr. P38, LL4-9)

Less:

I

Appellant's Labor

Ruidoso (Tr. PP169-174)
Roswell (Tr. PP176-180)
St. George (FINDINGS of trial
court)

$ 2,120.00
750.00
2,100.00

4,97U
$ 1, 819 .1J

Overall Profit On Three Homes

:::::=========:

Even if it is assumed that all improvements were
paid from Respondent's separate funds (an

assumption, incl·

dentally that would be contrary to the evidence at trial)
and that she should be reimbursed for them, there would still
be enough to pay Appellant the $4,970.00 for his six years
of work, leaving the profit of $1,819.23 to be divided.
1

That Appellant's work increased the value of their homes c~ ·
.
. "" .
f he fact
not be denied (Tr. P85, Lll), especially in view o t
that two of the homes were mobile homes which ordinarilY
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decline in value rather than appreciate.
on par,e 14 implies that Appellant,
to their homes,

Respondent's brief

through his improvements

did not provide any specialized skills despite

the fact that Appellant had been a contractor (Tr. P201, LLll-22)
because of Appellant's age and retired status.

To deny that

Appellant has made contributions simply because he has been
retired for a few years is patently absurd.

It is well known

that senior citizens can and do make significant contributions
in nearly every field of endeavor.
All of this is to say that Respondent has attempted
to reconstruct the record in self-serving ways to attempt to
cloud the fact that the award of the trial court was indeed
inequitable and unreasonable.

Whether Respondent likes it

or not, the record and the record only, can be used to evaluate
the case, not what one would like to have had the record show'.
Respondent argues that Appellant has the burden to
show an abuse of discretion and cites a few cases stating
that the trial court has wide discretion.

This, of course,

is true - the trial court has wide discretion - but one might
ask, how else can one show an abuse of that discretion other
than to show that the distribution was not in the general
range of 1/ 3 to the wife and 2/ 3 to the husband as is often
the case, or that it was not one-half to each which is sometimes done, but that the award of the trial court was 95. 3%
to Respondent and only 4. 7% to Appellant'.

411.at award was made

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the face of evidence that Appellant wa': living with a
widowed daughter in an apartment while Respondent was 1i ving
in her own home near her daughter who owns a large shopping
center (Page 5 of Appellant's brief).
CONCLUSION
Appellant in his brief has shown that the trial
court's findings were not, in fact, supported by the evidence f
Although the trial court recognized the value of Appellant's
work on the last home the re is no exp lana ti on why the trial
court ignored the value of Appellant's work on the first two
homes.
The Appellant's brief shows on page 18 that, as a
bare minimum, Appellant is entitled to an award of $5 ,879.61.
The Supreme Court, however, should not ignor the actual con·
duct of the parties through the eight transactions listed on
pages 22 and 23 of Appellant's brief, all of which are well
documented by the evidence produced at trial and which demon·
strate that Respondent made a gift to Appellant, which was
reaffirmed several times, of one-half their real property.
This court should not allow Respondent to revoke her gift
through this divorce.
In any event, however, the award oft h e cour

t belo1

should be modified to reflect justice and equity and not
serve as a vehicle to punish Appellant for -the breakup of

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

their marriage as was obviously the only explicable reason
for the award that was made by the court below.
The Appellant respectfully submits that even though
trial courts are given wide latitude, this is a case in which
this court should exercise its supervisory function to prevent the imposition of a grave injustice and a serious abuse
of discretion against the Appellant.
DATED this

f'.

rll day of November, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES

By

./bJ/, ,;?(

JOlili L. Miles

///I£""=

Attorney for the Appellant

-.
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